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Abstract 
 
The absence of a single democracy in the Arab-Muslim world has become a “striking 
anomaly” for scholars of democratization. The lack of democratization in this part of 
the world cannot be seen as caused religion as such since there are by now several 
states with a majority of Muslims that have become democracies. Several other 
explanations such as values, culture, economic development, rulers’ access to natural 
resources or the history of colonialism have been refuted. We present a novel 
explanation for this puzzle that is based on historical variations in “temple financing”. 
In Northwestern Europe, religion and also secular services managed by local religious 
institutions have been financed “from below” creating local systems for semi-
democratic representation, transparency and accountability. In the Arab-Muslim 
region, religion and local secular services have been financed “from above” by private 
foundations that have lacked systems for representation and accountability. It is thus 
not religion, but how religion has been financed, that is the explanation for the lack of 
democracy in the Arab-Muslim world. 
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Why is there no democracy in the Arab-Muslim world? 
 
Over the last century, several waves of democracy have swept over the globe, bringing 
representative democracy to places where it seemed inconceivable a hundred, fifty, or 
even thirty years ago. However, this impressive and historically unique process of 
democratization has left some spots dry; places were elections still are little more than 
theater and where the respect for human rights are lacking (Teorell 2010). The most 
notable region that is lacking successful transitions to democracy is the Arab-Muslim part 
of the world. In the aftermath of the 9/11-attacks, and the Bush-administration’s failed 
attempts to establish democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, a general notion of Muslim 
culture as incompatible with democracy has lived on, although under constant critique 
and lively debate.  
 
The perhaps strongest argument against Islam as essentially incompatible with 
democracy can be found by simply looking at ordinary Muslims’ political opinions. In 
recent years, a number of survey studies have noted an overwhelming support for 
democracy across the Muslim world, and this is true also for countries where the Arab 
Muslim populations are a minority and in also for Arab-Muslim countries were people 
live under autocratic rule (Braizat 2010 Arab Barometer 2009, Teorell 2010). 
Furthermore, these studies show that there is no difference in support for democracy 
between more and less religious individuals belonging ethnically to the Muslim culture 
(Tessler 2002; Jamal and Tessler 2008:101, Cifttci 2010). Haklai (2009:35) notes that the 
existing body of political culture research shows that  
 
there is no single Muslim mindset regarding democracy. Political 
culture studies have been finding that there is no relationship between 
the level of piety and religiosity, on the one hand, and attitudes and 
values related to democracy, on the other hand. 
 
As for the actual democratic performance in the Muslim world as a whole, Ibrahim 
(2007) reminds us that currently, two-thirds of the planet’s billion Muslims live under 
democratic rule, both in minority (most notably in India), majority (Indonesia, 
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Bangladesh, Senegal as well as in Turkey), and in roughly even numbers with Christians 
(Nigeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina). Furthermore, as Stepan and Robertson (2003) note, the 
democratic track-record since at least the 1970s of the 31 non-Arab Muslim-majority 
countries are as good as, and in a number of cases exceed, what can be expected, 
considering their level of economic prosperity. In the annual Freedom House rating for 
2010, 16 of these states are either rated ‘free’ or ‘partly free’. Eight achieve a score 3.5 or 
higher on this seven-point scale where seven is the top score. Perhaps not the most 
optimistic of results, but nonetheless comparable to other parts of the developing world, 
and combined with the results of the survey studies above these findings ought to be 
enough to dispel the notion of Islam as a religion or culture is inherently incompatible 
with democracy. 
 
This leaves us with the Middle East and North Africa (henceforth the MENA region), and 
the Arab states in particular, where there is currently no democratic country and only 
three of the sixteen states (Lebanon, Morocco and Kuwait) that are considered ‘partly 
free’.1 As Larry Diamond (2010:93) has put it: “The continuing absence of even a single 
democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly—the principal exception to 
the globalization of democracy.” Considering its economic wealth, something a large part 
of the region has accumulated plentifully through its oil fields, it has a much worse 
democratic track record than should have been expected. Seven of the sixteen Arab states 
fall under the ‘Electoral Underachiever’ category in Stepan and Robertsons’ (2003:34) 
study, and none are classified as ‘overachievers’. The same pattern exist in measures of 
what has been defined as quality of government factors (such as corruption) where the 
MENA countries scores much lower than what could be expected from their levels of 
economic development. Looking at the raw results, we do find huge differences: 
                                                 
1 This leaves out the region’s two democratic overachievers Israel (1,5 on the Freedom House 2010 rating) 
and Turkey (3), non-Arab, but in the former case with a considerable Muslim-minority, and in the latter, 
certainly a central part of the Middle East.  
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Table 1. Levels of Democracy and Corruption in Arab, Non-Arab Muslim and Western 
States.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data retrieved from the Quality of Government Database (V. 
May 27th, 2010). For a full list of the countries included, see 
Appendix. 
* Ranging between 0 (lowest) and 10 (highest). 
 
 
 
In addition to culture and religion, the system for generating wealth forms a second 
popular explanation for the region’s democratic deficit: the so called ‘oil curse’, or 
‘rentierism’, many claim, has damaged the prospects for democracy on a profound and 
structural level (Ross 2001, Ulfelder 2007). The logic behind the argument can be divided 
into several factors, the most cited being that a government which relies mainly upon 
‘windfall’ natural-resources for revenue grows less dependent upon tax income, and thus 
the need to create legitimacy from its citizenry in general. Consequently, the government 
can afford to disregard the wishes of the people, while ‘bribing’ them through a 
comprehensive welfare state, constructing what Sadiki (1997, and in Cavatorta 
forthcoming) refers to as ‘democracy of the bread’.  
 
Many authors have claimed that the region’s vast resources of petroleum have brought 
other negative effects as well. Notable experts on democratization, such as Bellin 
(2004:149) and Diamond (2010:101-102) note that its natural resources has made the 
region too strategically important to mess with, meaning that external powers have 
 Democracy 
(Freedom House/
Imputed Polity)* 
Corruption 
Perceptions Index 
(TI)* 
Mean 2,10 4,08 
N 16 16 
Arab 
Std. Dev. 1,41 1,39 
Mean 4,11 2,50 
N 31 30 
Non-Arab 
Muslim 
Std. Dev. 2,26 ,70 
Mean 9,96 7,89 
N 27 23 
Western 
Std. Dev. ,12 1,48 
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sanctioned autocratic rulers in exchange for political stability and thus insured petroleum 
exports, even after the end of the Cold War, when such support of authoritarian regimes 
was standard operating procedure throughout the developing world. A few decades ago, 
the ‘problem’ (for the Western Powers) was populist and secular nationalistic Nasserite 
movements, usually in liaison with the Soviet Union (Ghalioun 2004), today it is populist 
Islamist movements, often (but not always) connected to terror organizations. These 
threats have also led regimes to keep a considerable proportion of GNI and state revenue 
devoted to the security sector, a potent base for conducting political repression against 
internal democratic forces (Bellin 2004). 
 
Even if we accepted that the non-oil producing Arab states are as democratic as their 
wealth allows, and the richer, oil-producing states have been subject to democracy-
prohibiting rentierism, then we would conceivably be able to provide an explanation for 
the absence of democracy in the MENA region. But it would be a superficial explanation, 
since many poorer countries in other regions of the world have managed to democratize. 
Moreover, recent research shows that even heavy reliance on natural recourses does not 
necessarily stand in the way of democratization.  (Haber and Menaldo 2010:10, cf. Herb 
2005, Oskarsson and Ottosen 2010). Moreover, several countries in this region such as 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia do not have access to huge resources of oil or 
any other similar natural resources that can explain their lack of democratization. Also 
the foreign support argument has been somewhat tattered, as Saddam Hussein’s Baht-
regime survived well after Western support disappeared in the wake of the first Gulf War, 
managed through harsh sanctions, and only a second war managed to dethrone it; a 
similar experience can be seen in Libya post-Lockerbie, and Iran.  
 
The bottom line here is that while all the above accounts carry some merit, their ad hoc-
nature become apparent as we quickly find holes in any of the blanket explanations for 
why the seed of democracy has failed to take a strong root in the MENA countries. 
Teorell (2010), who has provided what we see as the hitherto most thorough empirical 
investigation for why some countries have democratized and others not since the 1970s, 
concludes that this puzzle can neither be explained by economic factors, nor by access to 
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oil, nor by an absence of popular mobilization, nor by lack neighbor diffusion, nor by 
popular support for democratic values and, lastly, nor by weak links to democratic 
regional organizations. He adds that so far, there is no explanation for the lack of 
democracy in the MENA region that stands up to an empirical scrutiny and ends his 
discussion by stating the following: 
 
What we need to know is not why Islamic countries in general have 
been less inclined to democratize, but why this has been the case in 
North Africa and the Middle East. Of course, Islam as a religion 
could still be a part of the answer to this question. But then only 
those features of Islam that are unique to this particular region 
(Teorell 2010:65). 
 
Consequently, the insight that we lack a general explanation for the absence of 
democracy in the MENA region leads us to a intellectual choice:either we have to 
identify a separate explanation for each state, or we should try to go deeper, further back 
in history and see if there are any underlying common traits of importance to the region 
(beside the apparently incorrect argument that is has to do with Islam as a religion). The 
former alternative avoids the danger of telling contrived overarching stories, while 
ignoring the historical and cultural ties that undeniably bind the region together. While 
several general symptoms have been unveiled in the studies, most importantly the oil 
curse,  they need to be complemented by a search for more profound causes. We are thus 
on the hunt for “those features of Islam that are unique for this particular region” but that 
does not have to do with the Muslim religion “as such” (Teorell 2010). 
 
One such historical explanation employed for the lack of democratic development, not 
specific to the Middle East, suggested by Ibrahim (2007), is the colonial argument, i.e. 
that Western powers, mainly the British and French, in the late 19th century aborted 
modernization attempts they themselves had initiated earlier in the same century. 
Furthermore, some states, such as Iraq, and Lebanon, were created as a result of colonial 
administration, without respect to ‘natural’ ethnic boundaries.  
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These explanations do go a little further, and enrich our understanding of the historical 
context, but raise further questions at the same time. First, artificial boundaries, and 
ensuing ethno-linguistic fractionalization are not necessarily a guarantee of autocracy, 
furthermore, compared to the rest of the former colonized world, ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization in the region is in no way exceptionally high (comparable to Latin 
America, data from Teorell et. al. 2010) with a few notable exceptions such as the pair 
mentioned above. Second, the colonial argument does not explain why no Arab state has 
made a complete transition to democracy, as in all other regions once under colonial rule, 
plenty of states have undergone successful democratization.  
 
Last, but perhaps most important to our argument, Ibrahim’s account does not answer for 
why these states would even need a ‘colonial spark’ in order to modernize, especially 
since they have such a technologically and culturally advanced history (cf. Lewis 
2002:153). It is today easy to forget how powerful and sophisticated the world of the 
Middle East was not too long ago, not only when comparing with other developing 
countries, but with Europe as well; discounting this and placing the analytic emphasis on 
the, generally brief, colonial era would thus be grossly insufficient. Studying inherent 
factors, processes and institutions, and the path dependence they create for later 
generations, have been largely successful in explaining the development of the Occident 
(North 1990, North Wallis and Weingast 2009, Ertman 2005) , and ignoring such an 
approach in the Orient would be a mistake. Kubba (2008) opens up for what such an 
explanation could look like: 
 
After the Ottoman Empire collapsed amid the aftershocks of the First 
World War, young elites emerged to run newly born states throughout the 
Middle East. These new rulers adopted modern institutions and ended 
archaic mixtures of traditions and religion in state politics such as the 
caliphate (abolished by Turkey’s Kemal Atatürk in 1924). Yet these same 
leaders reproduced the old Ottoman culture of authoritarianism, albeit in 
modernized forms. Today’s Middle East, with its plethora of sophisticated, 
military-backed police states, is their legacy. … Despite decades of 
modernization efforts, Muslim-majority countries are still places where 
civil societies are weak, power rests with the military, and various 
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minorities and elites have exclusive control over state bureaucracies and 
sources of national wealth such as oil. (Kubba 2008:37-38) 
 
How do we account for the historical roots of this legacy? While quite possibly 
exacerbating factors, oil-dependence, geopolitical unrest, colonial and neocolonial 
heritages, and authoritarian elite strategies, were clearly not the cause of these legacies. 
Instead, we have to turn our directions toward the factors and institutions that enabled this 
system to persevere and reproduce itself into the present day. 
 
One clue is given by Larry Diamond (2010) who argues that the aggregate figures for 
Arab support for democracy in recent surveys hides the fact that in the five countries 
surveyed between 2003 and 2006 by the Arab Barometer, 56 percent of respondents 
agreed that “men of religion should have influence over government decisions.” These 
surveys show that there is no majority for a secular type of democracy in these countries. 
The question is how to understand this support for theocratic rule in the MENA region. 
However, one should bear in mind the argument presented by Teorell (2010) that blaming 
specific religions for hindering democratization has proven to be a false road. As he 
points out, in the 1970s, Catholicism was thought to hinder democratization but since 
then southern Europe and large parts of Latin America has democratized. In the same 
manner, Confucianism was thought to be anathema to democracy but this has been 
disapproved by the democratization of South Korean and Taiwan. It should be added that 
there is not much that speaks in favor of the argument that the inherent religious message 
in Protestantism has “created democracy” (Bruce 2004)     
 
If we instead look at political institutions, the Ottoman reforms of the mid 19th century 
(Tanzimat) were designed to break with the old, patrimonial systems of authority. 
Anderson (1987:5) notes that “[w]ell before these efforts were to bear all their fruit, 
however, Ottoman administrative development was suspended when the Europeans 
dismantled the empire after World War I.” The development did not look the same 
everywhere; Turkey, as the power-center of the old Empire, along with some coastal 
zones, reliant upon commerce, along the Eastern Mediterranean, managed to retain most 
of the existing bureaucratic achievements, together with the rise of a rising middle class. 
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The result in Turkey was a system wherein the state, with a Platonic, centralized 
bureaucratic and military elite at the helm, dominated civil society (Sosay 2007, Sozen 
and Shaw 2002:480, see also Anderson 1987 on Tunisia and Egypt). Other, more 
peripheral regions of the interior and eastern frontiers of the Empire (Emrence 2008), 
were left far more to the influence local notables, and/or vulnerable to colonial 
devastation, as Anderson (1987:5) notes in the case of the Italians in Libya. A heritage 
common to all regions, disregarding their bureaucratic strengths seem to be the preva-
lence of clientelism and patronage politics (Sozen and Shaw 2002:481, Jamal 2007:14). 
How, then, could this have come to be?  
 
Our argument is that this puzzle in democratization research, that is, the peculiar lack of 
democracy in the Arab-Muslim countries in the MENA region, can be explained by the 
historical roots of their systems of taxation and what type of politics that follows from 
these different systems of taxation. First, this is shown at the local level, particularly in 
how religious services along with other local services historically have been financed. 
Secondly, the differences between the systems of taxation in the MENA region and in 
most parts of Europe are also shown at the central state level. Here, countries in the 
MENA region relied much more on a system known as “tax farming” than was the case 
in Western countries.  
 
Our central argument is that the lack of democracy in the MENA region should not be 
explained by Islam as a religion, but by how the religion has been financed. In most 
societies and for most people practicing a religion, religious practices are not for free. 
Temples have to be built and maintained, priests must be hired and get salaries, religious 
schools and seminars have to be established, burial grounds have to be bought and kept in 
order, etc. In addition, in both Muslim and Christian societies, the local religious 
organizations (in the Christian West this has been the parishes) have historically been 
responsible for a whole host of other things such as social assistance, religious as well as 
secular education and, in many cases, also important parts of the local infrastructure such 
as roads and system for water provision. As we will show, the system for financing these 
local activities, both the religious and the non-religious ones, have historically been very 
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different when we compare the Arab-Muslim world to the Western Christian world. 
Secondly, for extracting resources to the central state, countries in the MENA region have 
historically relied heavily on a system known as tax-farming that catered to power being 
exercised in the form of personalism, particularism and patronage while the opposite has 
been true for most of the state-building process in the Western Christian world.  Our 
central idea for explaining the lack of democratization in the MENA region is thus the 
one used in political economy, namely to “follow the money” as initially suggested by 
Palmstierna (2009).  
 
In this, we build on research which shows that taxation cannot only be seen an 
administrative system for the authorities to collect revenue. Instead, with taxation usually 
follows three other things. One is a demand for as well as a need for representation. If 
people are going to part with substantial amounts of money, they will demand to be heard 
not only about the level of taxation but also about how the money is going to be used 
Secondly, several scholars have pointed out that for rulers to extract resources, installing 
systems for popular consent to ensure legitimacy is likely to increase the amount of 
revenue they can collect (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad & Moore 2008; Levi 1988; Levi & Sachs 
2009, Steinmo 1992). To this we want to add a third feature, namely that taxation also 
increases demands for accountability and for “quality of government” (Persson 2008). 
The reason behind this is that people who pay taxes will demand a system in which the 
bookkeeping is checked and were the persons elected or appointed to manage the funds 
can be held accountable. As stated in a recent volume on this subject: 
 
The state-building role of taxation can be seen in two principal areas: 
the rise of a social contract based on bargaining around tax, and the 
institution-building stimulus provided by the revenue imperative. 
Progress in the first area may foster representative democracy. 
Progress in the second area strengthens state capacity. Both have the 
potential to bolster the legitimacy of the state and enhance 
accountability between the state and its citizens (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad 
& Moore 2008:1).  
 
 Moreover, people will not be willing to part with their money if the tax administration 
(and the public administration more generally) is known to be corrupt, discriminatory or 
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engages in other breaches of impartiality (Rothstein 2011).  Low levels of corruption and 
high levels of quality of government (or “good governance) are thus related to taxation 
(Persson & Rothstein 2010).  
 
In brief, our solution to the puzzle is that when financing religion, the Arab-Muslim and 
the European-Christian parts of the world have historically relied on two very different 
systems. We want to draw special attention to the local level where religion (and its 
related activities) has been finance “from above” in the Arab-Muslim world by a special 
type of foundation that has been insulated from influences from the majority of people in 
the community. Since people in the Arab-Muslim world as a general rule have not had to 
pay taxes for the religious services, and to a large extent, not also for other services 
handled by the local religious organizations, neither demand “from below” nor a need 
“from above” for representation and accountability have been established. The system for 
“temple financing” has been radically different in the European-Christian world where 
these practices (or “public goods”) have for the most part been financed “from below” 
through the local congregations or parishes since Christianity’s founding years, requiring 
accountability rules and supervision from the beginning (as already Edward Gibbon 
pointed out in his the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire).  As we will show, 
historically this has come with a surprisingly intricate system for semi-democratic 
representation, transparency and accountability.  
    
Before presenting this analysis, a note about representative democracy is needed. There 
are innumerous interpretations of how this system of governance should be understood. 
Here we want to contrast two different perspectives and argue for why we concentrate 
our analysis on of them. One perspective about democratic governance is to understand it 
as a system for channeling conflicts of interests between different groups so that they can 
be resolved by peaceful resolutions. In this perspective, where Schumpeter is the most 
well-known figure, the representative democratic system is to be understood as an arena 
for interest struggles where different groups or social classes “fight” under regulated 
forms to take control over public policies (Hermansson 1993). In recent times, theorists 
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influenced by post-modernism such as Chantal Mouffe (2005) have taken up this idea but 
changed conflict of interests to fights about discourses and identities.  
     
A different perspective of representative democracy emphasize the need for every society 
(local as well as national), to produce a relatively large number of public goods. As is 
well-known, these are goods that everyone benefits from but since they are non-
exclusive, there is a risk that “free-riding” will be common making the production of the 
public good in question difficult or impossible. Security issues, protection of human and 
property rights and, in one of our cases, the production of resources that are needed to 
“do religion” could be counted.  Infrastructure and systems for social insurance and 
protection are other examples. Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s research on how local 
communities sometimes have managed so called “common pool resources” and 
overcome what is known as “the tragedy of the commons” is central in this perspective 
on democracy (Ostrom 1990). Without denying the importance of the former interest 
struggle perspective, we concentrate our analysis about the importance of local 
democracy on the latter way of understanding what representative democracy “is about”, 
namely how a (mostly local) group or society decide about and manage the public goods 
it needs to sustain itself as a society. If this is to be done by representation “from below”, 
we should expect to see less of democracy as an interest struggle and more of it as a way 
to create legitimacy through consensus and what in European historiography about local 
community politics has been called “communalism” (Aronsson 1992:23-27, Blickle 1997 
and 2000). Historically, and of course also for many people nowadays, religious services 
are seen as such public goods. If there is no organization that will provide the resources 
“from above”, no temple will be built or maintained and no religious leaders will be 
employed. And if the resources are going to the created “from below”, we should expect 
demands for representation, accountability, quality of the implementation process and 
systems for hindering free-riding. As summarized in a recent volume on this topic: 
 
Taxpayers who believe that their interests are represented in a 
democracy may be more willing to pay taxes, but they also begin to 
believe that their payment of taxes gives them the right to 
representation….. Representation, however, is only one element of 
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the fiscal contract. The bargain might also involve services: public 
goods (benefits provided to producers or consumers). And it 
involves pressure on governments to be accountable to taxpayers for 
the use of their money (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad & Moore 2008:12) 
     
For the local perspective, we have been fortunate to be able to draw on some excellent, 
but highly specialized, historical research about the organization of parishes, communes 
and systems of taxation in these two different parts of the world. For Europe, we have 
concentrated specifically of studies England and from the 15th century and onwards, and 
Sweden from the 17th century, as well as their counterparts in the Arab-Muslim world. 
Analyzing this fascinating historical research, what we have found are two diametrically 
different ways of how to “finance the temple” which in its turn has led to two completely 
different ways of how to organize local political representation, accountability and the 
local administration. The same difference, although to a somewhat lesser extent, exists 
for taxation to the central state. For what we know, this is the first time the results from 
this type of historical research in these two areas of the world  have been systematically 
compared as a way to understand the puzzle described above.         
  
 
The MENA region: The Waqf-fare Local State 
 
"Charity degrades those who receive it and hardens those who dispense it." 
(George Sand 1842) 
 
The dominant form in the Arab-Muslim world for financing local religious services and 
other local public goods  has revolved around a specific and unique foundation type 
institution known as the waqf (in Arabic [pl. awqaf]; in Turkish vakif). The term loosely 
translates to “forbidding movement, transport or exchange of something” (Raissouni 
2001).  A waqf is a religious (widely defined) large endowment, originally intended for 
charitable use. The historical origin of this institution is unclear, but already Mohammed 
encouraged the establishment of such an arrangement. Similar  institutions are known to 
have existed in the Byzantine Empire, as well as ancient Persia (Makdisi 1981:227). 
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While the waqf institutions and its practice exist to this day, the focus of this study will 
revolve around its historical significance and the legacy it has left behind. 
 
A person founding a waqf can and could be anyone, but it generally tended to be men2 of 
large wealth and influence, most notably members of the religious and military 
aristocracy (Barnes 1986:154). Motives, besides religious piety and a charitable urge, for 
founding a waqf were plentiful. For one, thanks to weaknesses in Islamic property rights 
and strictness of Shari’ah inheritance laws, waqf was one of few means to protect a 
family’s wealth (Kuran 2001, pp. 853).3 Another oft-cited reason for establishing a waqf 
was to increase the founder’s and family’s social standing and prestige, which in turn 
could generate patronage power and political clout within the local community (Makdisi 
1981:40). By devoting a waqf deed (waqfiyyat) to the educational sector and religious 
schools (madrasahs), the founder could stipulate what was being thought in the 
schools:Just as important, the founder could accrue influence and patronage among the 
ulama, the important class of religious scholars in Muslim societies who were among the 
prime beneficiaries, and not seldom caretakers, of the waqf system (Makdisi 1981:40, 
Sedgwick 2003:40, Zürcher 1994:18). 
 
Although sultans and members of the ruling elite tended to be amongst the prime patrons 
of waqf endowments, they did so as individuals, rather than as officials of the regime. 
Makdisi (1981:281) describes how this religious-educational practice was 
institutionalized in Arab-Muslim countries: 
 
A private individual, the founder, instituted as waqf his own privately owned 
property for a public purpose, that of educating a segment of Muslim society, 
which he chose, in one or more of the religious sciences... He created his 
foundation by an act of his own free will, without interference from any authority 
or power. Even when the founder was a caliph or sultan or other highly placed 
functionary, he created an institution in his capacity as a private individual.  … 
the state, that is, the governing power had no control over the curriculum, or the 
                                                 
2 Although to a no negligible extent women (Fay 1997: 34) 
3 One may reflect that this possibility may have contributed to the attraction of Islam e.g. in the Balkans as 
the protection of Byzantine property law crumbled 
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methods of instruction, any more than did it over the foundation of the 
institution.  
 
Peri (1992) shows that this limitation of institutional authority was not only confined to 
the educational system. In addition, through the waqf system, the rulers – be they 
Caliphs, or local notables – could provide social welfare, religious services and other 
public services to their subjects or clients in order to strengthen their power and over the 
local community. Peri further adds that through this system, the rulers could increase 
their power “far beyond what they could achieve through the formal frameworks of power that 
were under their hand”. (Peri 1992:174, see also Shatzmiller 2001:60). Moreover, the 
founder of a waqf was free to appoint the chief administrator, the mutawalli, which could 
be a member of the founder’s own family, and often an ulama, religious scholar. This 
position has often been inherited, thus generating a dynastic form of influence over the 
institution. This made it difficult for beneficiaries, or stakeholders, and of course the local 
population, to weather complaints regarding maintenance of the waqf or garner insight 
into its operations. As Baer puts it: 
 
A charitable or religious institution, or "the poor" for that matter, had little power 
over the family administrator, and recurrent government attempts to impose such 
control failed completely until the middle of the twentieth century, not least of all 
because the provisions established in waqfiyyat were often ambiguous. 
Administrators also were able to provide members of their family with material 
advantages deriving from the waqf, such as the perpetual lease of waqf property. 
(Baer 1997:270).  
 
Awqaf were thus a top-down institution under the power of one trustee who was 
appointed or inherited the position rather than being elected. Moreover, contrary to 
Western parishes and other local communes, the Waqf administration was not 
accountable the people that used their services which diminished the need for developing 
accounting rules. Even if mutawallis were conducting their work with the interest of the 
people in mind, the awqaf inherently lacked the institutional devices “from below” to 
change and adapt to new conditions, as the endowments were subject to the ‘dead hand’ 
of the founder’s stipulation, whether it be centuries old. Kuran complains that, “[u]nlike 
 
 
- 17 -
western municipalities and other governmental agencies, which were authorized to tax 
constituents, change their own budgets and impose new ordinances, the waqf system 
could not make the necessary adaptations.” (Kuran 2004:78).  Although the modern-day 
waqf institution has changed in many ways, its management is still fraught with problems 
with “no transparency and lack of accountability” (Ibrahim et al 2006:27).  
 
Due to its many uses, as well as its long history, the waqf institution is certainly a 
complex one, and only the core of its features and aspects can be dealt with here. What 
we can conclude is that it has had an immensely important role in shaping the social, 
political and economic fabric of Middle Eastern life for centuries. Marshall Hodgson 
(1974a:124) has characterized waqf as a “vehicle for financing Islam as a society”. As an 
example, at the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, three quarters of all arable land in 
Turkey was waqf land (Kuran 2001:849). Awqaf was the major producer of many public 
goods, which could take the shape of mosques, soup kitchens (which in the 18th century 
fed 30,000 of a total of 700,000 citizens of Constantinople (Kuran 2001:850) schools of 
higher learning (Medrasahs), roads, and water fountains, among other things (Kahf 
1992:8-11, Yüksel 1997). According to some observers, it was thereby possible for a 
person to live in a veritable ‘waqf-fare state’, quite able to accompany an individual from 
the cradle to the grave: 
 
thanks to the prodigious development of the waqf institution, a person could be 
born in a house belonging to a waqf, sleep in a cradle of that waqf and fill up on 
its food, receive instruction through waqf-owned books, become a teacher in a 
waqf school, draw a waqf financed salary, and, at his death, be placed in a waqf-
provided coffin for burial in a waqf cemetery. In short, it was possible to meet all 
one's needs through goods and services immobilized as waqf. (Yediylldlz 1990:5, 
cit. in Kuran 2001:851)  
 
As Hodgson (1974a:124) concludes, “through the waqfs, the various civic essentials and 
even amenities were provided for on a private yet dependable basis without need or fear 
of the intervention of political power.” As for the macroeconomic effects, Çizakça 
(2000:8) notes that “economists looking at the waqf system would be perplexed by the 
fact that a myriad of essential services such as health, education, municipal, etc., have 
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historically been provided at no cost whatsoever to the government.” We should add that 
these services were thus provided without the need for taxation. Çizakça continues to 
note that, for the issue of income distribution, “taxation [was] definitely assigned a 
secondary role.” Furthermore, waqf property itself was generally not subject to taxation 
(Darling 1996:47). A Waqf would generally consist of two parts: the charitable institution 
in question, and the revenue-raising side, i.e. investments, which would often be 
agricultural land or property, generating dues, and as time progressed, cash that could 
yield interest over time (Inalcik 1969:133, Faroqhi 1974) 
 
During the modernization efforts of the latter 19th, and throughout the 20th century, the 
waqf system suffered a decline in use, but it has for the last few decades shown signs of 
recovery. The centralization process itself underwent great difficulties due to the 
difficulties in establishing the worth of the myriad of awqaf, along with dishonest 
bureaucrats who themselves managed to embezzle significant portions of the revenue 
they were set to gather (Çizakça 1997:14, Barnes 1986:155-156). Kahf, however, notes 
that the traditional pattern of of Waqf management survived those parts of the Islamic 
world subjugated under colonial rule, and thus survived “a good part of the twentieth 
century” (Kahf 1992:11). 
 
While the historical trajectory of the Islamic world changed over time, through expansion 
and decline, decentralized weak state formations and centralized absolutist rulers, the 
popularity of the waqf system seems to have been a constant since at least 750 AD 
(Kuran 2001:842), and alongside it, the state’s role as absentee landlord. Even during the 
pinnacle of Ottoman rule, when rulers managed to associate “the major civilian 
institutions relatively closely with the central state power” (Hodgson 1974b:99), the basic 
structures of the waqf system was kept intact.  
 
Seen in a larger context, the waqf system illustrates a feature that, in different shapes 
reproduced itself for at least a thousand years, wherein the state functionally separated its 
responsibilities from ‘softer’ societal areas, such as religion, education and welfare – a 
task left to the religious authorities, and funded by waqf, even during the height of 
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Ottoman rule. Without having to introduce a system of taxation, the waqf-system took 
care of religious services and schooling, social welfare and also handled mediation of 
local disputes (Lapidus 1997:18. As stated by Kuran 
 
The waqf system represented, in effect, an implicit bargain between rulers 
and their wealthy subjects. Rulers made a credible commitment to leave 
certain property effectively in private hands; in return, waqf founders agreed 
to supply social services, thus unburdening the state of potential 
responsibilities. (Kuran 2004:75) 
 
As we interpret this, a wealthy family could protect much of their wealth over time by 
creating a waqf. In exchange, the waqf would finance the religious services and also other 
social services in their local area. An effect of this system was that the local community 
using the services did not have to pay for them and thereby could not claim any influence 
in the form of representation or systems for accountability. As Lewis argues, in the Arab 
Muslim world, the organization of society has traditionally been tied to religion, rather 
than the state, and only much more recently did the state step in (Lewis 2002:110- 112). 
To use the terminology from studies of state-building, the waqf system led to a lasting 
legacy of personalism, patronage, and lack of accountability. In fact, as Berman 
(2009:225), states, the waqf system was effectively “crowding out the need to organize 
municipal provision that would have required tax collection.” What resulted was a 
‘privatization’ of the administrative structure (Salzmann 1993:394) and public sphere, 
wherein sultans, military and bureaucratic aristocracy, tax entrepreneurs, local notables 
(ayan), and not least religious scholars (ulama) could assert more or less unchecked 
power of over the population in a system which, to a varying extent, worked  from at least 
the 9th until at least the 1800s. Most important, this system of financing public goods such 
as religious services failed to instate the institutional framework of representation and 
accountability that, as we will argue in the next section, were essential for the 
development of a “culture of democracy” in the Christian west. 
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Northwestern Europe: Communalism in the Parishes 
 
The central concept for understanding the European equivalent to the Waqf-fare state is 
communalism which has been developed in a great number of major historical works by 
Peter Blickle who has investigated to role of local pre-democratic structures in especially 
Southern Germany, Switzerland and what is now parts of Austria in Western Europe in 
general from the 15th to the 17th century (Blickle 1989, 1996, 1997, 2000; see also 
Aronsson 1992a:25-28 and 1992b as well as Pounds 2004). Largely, communalism is 
defined as the capacity of a town or village to take charge of and promote its interests 
against the feudal hierarchy. This capacity was based on the commune's power to manage 
its economic, religious and social affairs by establishing local rules including forms for 
handling transgression of such rules. Moreover, the enactment of this local regulatory 
authority did not, according to Blickle, depend on any lordly consent, which would have 
been antithetical to the commune's claim to assert its interests. Communalism thus stands 
as an alternative to feudalism and absolutism that has dominated much historical research 
of politics and power in Europe during this period. The most important political structure 
of these communal arrangements, which according to Blickle had the same basic form in 
towns and country villages, was the communal or parish assembly, usually an annual 
meeting with all the householders who had to deliberate and decide upon issues that 
affected the entire commune and, important in this analysis, decide about fees and taxes. 
Five features of this type of local governance are emphasized by Blickle. One is the idea 
of egalitarianism in the assembly, the second the notion of the existence of “a common 
good”, the third is the idea to elect representatives which, fourth, should be held 
accountable for how they handled economic resources and implemented the locally 
decided rules and regulations. It should be added that these local communal structures, 
after the reformation in many instances came to wield large amounts of power and take 
responsibility for the local religious services. As Kümin (1996:11) states regarding the 
situation in the 16th century: "Having achieved a strong political and legal position, many 
rural and urban communities in Central Europe began to supervise the moral life of their 
clergy, to administer parish funds,..... political and religious power was anything but a 
monopoly of traditional feudal elites.”  A detailed study of three local parishes in Sweden 
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during the 16th and 17th century reveals that the commoners could exercise a 
considerable amount of self-governing, not least in ecclesiastical affairs. This study 
points at the connection between control of the economic resources “from below” and 
power over the church practices: 
 
The material responsibility for the church, the vicarage, and the parish 
treasury, gave the peasants a material advantage which could be transformed 
in part into an ideological resource… the popular view of what constituted 
good cultic practice and good divine services could be formulated with a 
greater degree of legitimacy (Aronsson 1992a:347) 
 
It should be added that in general the parishes were not used a as local organization for 
implementing policies or for the collection of taxes as an agent for aristocracy or the 
central state. Tax collection for the central state was in general carried out by separate 
administrative entities (Cederholm 2007:346). Moreover, the elected churchwardens in 
England could be sworn in when the Bishops made their visitations, but “ecclesiastical 
officials had no authority to refuse of dismiss them. Their principal loyalty was to their 
community, not the Church” (Kümin 1996:29) 
 
What characterized the discussions and forms of decisions at the parish assembly 
meetings was a strong emphasis on reaching consensus and to view the goods that the 
parish had responsibility over as “common goods”. Both in the English and the Swedish 
case as well as in the areas in Continental Europe covered by Blickle’s studies, there 
seem to have been very little of “politics as interest struggle” within the parishes and 
other communal local assemblies (Aronsson 1992a, Cederholm 2007:546, Kümin 1996, 
see also Gustafsson 1989). Instead, it seems as if the type of politics resemble what is 
described by Elinor Ostrom (1990) in her analyses of modern day local communities 
trying to “govern the commons”.  However, this local consensus for the common good 
type of politics did in many instances give rise to a vertical type of conflict between the 
local communal bodies vis-à-vis the central church as well as the feudal lords (Cederholm 
2007, Blickle 2000). 
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Aronsson (1992a) also underlines that during the 18th century, the area of responsibility 
for the local parishes in Sweden started to grow. A number of secular responsibilities 
came under the jurisdiction of local communal board such as care for the destitute, the 
establishment of public schools, local systems for credit and insurance and infrastructure. 
The same is true for the English parishes, although it seems to have happened earlier, 
namely that the parishes extended their responsibilities to things like the “maintenance or 
roads and bridges, the relief of the poor and the preservation of public order” (Pounds 
2004:201, see also French 2001). From the beginning of the 17th century, managing poor 
relief became a heavy responsibility for the elected officeholders in the local parishes 
who had to collect special taxes for this purpose and, not least, distribute the relief and by 
this deciding who was eligible and if deemed eligible, how much they should be given 
according to (their interpretation of) the rules (Hindle 2004:296-298, cf. French 2001) 
 
Regarding the positions as church warden and members of the parish council, in Sweden 
these positions circulated so that over a decade, almost every landholding peasant had 
been an elected representative (Aronsson 1992a:309). In a similar manner, studies of the 
structure of the English parishes show that the central position as church warden in 
practice circulated among “ordinary people” and that it was customary that no one could 
have the position for more than two years. Although the position could carry quite large 
economic and administrative responsibilities, churchwardens in England represented a 
surprisingly wide spectrum of the social strata such as bakers, blacksmiths, butchers, 
shop-keepers, tailors and carpenters (Kümin 1996:30).  People from the gentry rarely 
appeared but on some rare occasions women could be elected a warden (Pounds 
2004:234).  
  
Thus, the picture that emerges is a system for managing and financing local religious 
practices and later many secular practices that is a complete opposite of the waqf-system. 
After the reformation in Northwestern Europe, it was local semi-democratic political 
structures with elected representatives that decided and collected the taxes, decided upon 
building and maintenance of the religious temples and other constructions and had a 
considerable influence also over religious practices. There is, however, one more feature 
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of this system of “communalism” in Northwestern Europe that needs to be pointed out. 
As stated above, present day Arab-Muslim countries do not only lack democracy, but also 
“good governance” and “quality of government”.  In a comparative perspective, and 
especially given their current economic standard, they are to a higher degree than could 
be expected ridden by problems of corruption, clientelism and patronage. A very likely 
reason for this is that the economic transactions within the Waqf-system have lacked 
institutionalized forms for transparency and local accountability. As we have described 
above, the people who use the religious or social services produced by the Waqf-system 
usually does not pay anything and from which follows that they have little reason to 
demand transparency and accountability. From our readings of the history of the parish 
system in Northwestern Europe, the situation has been completely different in these two 
respects. For reason of space, we will concentrate on the situation in the English parishes 
during the late medieval period. The first thing to note is that the elected church wardens 
came to control substantial amounts of money and other resources. As Kümin tells it: 
 
the wardens administered, bought, and sold property, organized collections 
of certain feasts, lent out money and various church goods, received 
testamentary bequests and contributions by local guilds, staged 
entertainments, and demanded fees for bell ringing or burial, while 
spending money on church maintenance, ornaments, salaries, subsidies, 
bridge-building, legal matters, priests and ceremonies (Kümin 1996:29). 
    
There is no doubt that the economic resources that could be entrusted to a church warden 
were substantial. Contrary to the administrators of the Waqf-system, church wardens 
usually kept a strict separation between their private money and the communal resources 
they were elected to administer. Several historians have pointed out how remarkably 
detailed and to the minute the accounts were kept, not least considering that this was 
before literacy was common among the English commoners (Pounds 2004:229, Kümin 
1996:221, see also French 2001). Moreover, audit regulations were strict making the 
church wardens accountable to those who had elected them. At the yearly parish 
assembly, all accounts and receipts were scrutinized, the “audit day was an opportunity 
for the parish assembly to exercise its sovereignty" (Kümin 1996:30). To this, one should 
add the visitations by the Bishops for checking the religious practices. The original Greek 
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word for Bishop episkopoi, literally means “overseer”. To our knowledge, nothing similar 
to these two systems of accountability and local transparency has existed within the Arab-
Muslim organization of the costs or practices for religion.  
 
 
Tax Farming, State Building and Democracy 
 
While the local religious, educational and social services in the MENA region were 
largely handled by the waqf system and in Western Europe by local self-governing 
communal assemblies and parishes, in both areas the central state did of course needed to 
collect taxes. For this, states in the MENA region largely came to rely on a system known 
as “tax-farming”. The system is not completely unique to the MENA region, but it has 
been shaping the region in a far greater capacity than in western Europe. As Çizakça 
(1989:76) notes, “tax-farming dominated the life of the Muslims for more than one 
thousand years in a geographical dimension stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian 
Ocean”. The basic principles of tax-farming are fairly simple; the state sublets the rights 
to collect taxes to private actors, who pays a fixed amount in advance, thus assuming the 
risk of the enterprise. The people who engaged in tax-farming resembles those who 
founded awqaf, i.e. men of power and wealth, often dignitaries close to the state, 
especially military officers (Barkey 2008:ch. 7). From the perspective of accountability 
and political legitimacy there are many well-known problems with this system. These 
include corruption, over-exploitation of the tax-base, and, perhaps most importantly, the 
arresting of developing a professional Weberian type tax bureaucracy. Furthermore, it 
runs the risk of blurring the lines between public and private, while creating a distance 
between administration and citizenry (Kasaba 1988:13). As Stella argues: 
 
The aim of modern developing country tax administrations should be to observe 
not only the outcome, but the process of tax collection, safeguarding taxpayer 
rights and the least social cost. Although tax farming facilitates monitoring the 
outcome, it compounds the problem of monitoring the process. The greater the 
decentralization, the more difficult it is to monitor the process and achieve 
accountability (Stella 1993:219) 
 
 
- 25 -
 
Although the most top-down prone analyses of history, wherein pre-modern populations 
are seen merely as passive subjects, may be too simplified, the negotiations about taxes, 
duties and services during the tax-farming era did not occur between ruler and subject, as 
much as between ruler and tax-farmer, and then the tax-farmer and the people that were 
“farmed” for taxes. Tax-farmers were in general prone to subduing tax-payers by 
paternalistic means in a manner closely resembling the old feudal system, (cf. Anderson 
1987:6).  
 
Furthermore, most historical accounts of tax farming show that it has tended to be very 
unpopular amongst the population at large (Kiser 2008). While citizens of the Ottoman 
Empire were able to take their complaints of over-exploitation to the state, the 
discretionary power over tax rates that the tax-farmers possessed, in combination with a 
limited knowledge of these stipulations amongst the tax base, along with the fact that the 
state itself was borrowing money from these entrepreneurs, made it hard to control the 
tax-farmers in practice (Çizakça 1989:67, Özdeger n.d.:36, Ma 2003:447). Hence, 
“agricultural taxation was reduced to a relationship between the tax farmer and the 
cultivator in which the government intervened only ineffectually and sporadically” writes 
Kasaba (1988:66) 
 
As mentioned, tax-farming did occur both in the West and the Middle East, and while the 
intricacies of this practice are too many and complex for the space in these pages, some 
major differences should be noted:First, where tax-farming in France and Britain were 
used extensively, it was eventually effectively centralized, and abolished while in the 
Ottoman Empire, despite attempts of the state eliminate it, tax-farming managed to live 
on well into the 20th century and as a result bringing the empire to the brink of economic 
collapse. (Findley 1980:310, Barkey 2008:230, 271). Second, the extent of tax farming 
seems to have been much greater in the Middle East. For example, whereas Western tax-
farming mainly limited itself to customs and salt taxes, Ottoman tax-farmers were also 
engaged in collecting land rents and tithes – taxes levied upon individuals (Salzmann 
1993:400, Darling 1996:47). The effect of this was according to Lewis: 
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The economic and social power derived from the permanent local control 
of tax-farms and leases produced a new propertied, influential class in the 
provinces, which soon began to play a prominent part in local affairs. This 
class interposed itself between the government and the peasantry, and 
intercepted much of the revenue. In theory they only held possession as 
lessees or tax-farmers, but as the government, through growing weakness, 
lost control of the provinces, these new landowners were able to increase 
both the extent of their holdings and the security of their tenure. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they even began to usurp some of the 
functions of government (Lewis 1961:440) 
 
Subsequently, we can observe many of the elements of the waqf discussion here as 
well:A state which gives private actors who are not elected as representatives of those 
that are to pay taxes the power and the responsibility for carrying out taxation resulting in 
a system with a lack of transparency and accountability. This had a “crowding out” effect 
on political representation and of the establishment of high quality government 
institutions, since the state “benefited in that tax-farming did not require the 
establishment of any complex system of collection, a body of officials to collect taxes, a 
mechanism to ensure payment … or any attendant bureaucracy” (Fleet 2003:252), .  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The revenue that governments need can be generated from several sources, such as spoils 
of war, owning land, establishing monopolies or capitalizing on natural resources. 
However, the most important stream of public finances has arguably been taxation from 
the subjects. In order to successfully do this, states and local governments have to 
develop an administrative infrastructure sufficient to collect enough taxes and this will be 
more effective if a certain degree of consent from the taxpayers can be established.  
(Bräutigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008; Levi 1988). In a worst-case scenario, consent 
can border on near-zero, at which point the collection process will turn extremely costly 
since extracting taxes by brute force instead of having people paying them through 
consent is very resource demanding. Once consent is achieved, it is possible to speak of a 
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social contract between ruler and ruled, wherein the latter pays the former to guarantee 
protection and other sorts of public goods. From this base of hierarchical integration, 
vertical integration – between citizens, interest groups and sovereign states – 
subsequently ensues.  
 
In the Western historical trajectory, modernization has meant that the state over time has 
been able to integrate these relationships, from early parishes and feudal arrangements, 
through communes and municipalities. There are, however clear differences in the nature 
of the Western and Arabic-Islamic modernization processes, and progress of respective 
social contracts which we believe have contributed greatly to the current differences in 
democracy and quality of government between the two regions. 
 
As one of the great paradoxes of the Islamic world, during the Caliphates, and 
particularly the Ottoman Empire, the power of the ruler was in many ways absolute and 
all encompassing as the state owned, on paper, all land, and the central bureaucracy was 
indeed forceful, but at the same time the state apparatus was not a part of ordinary 
citizens’ lives, especially in the periphery of the Empire. Bernard Lewis (1998:96) notes 
that  
The introduction of the European practice of conscription in the early nineteenth 
century brought both peasants and townsfolk, for the first time, into close and 
continued relationship with the state, for the first time and with those who 
exercised state authority. Previously, their direct experience of the state authority 
had been limited to the collection of taxes and the enforcement of law. Both of 
these demanded obedience. Neither of them required or inspired any sentiment of 
loyalty.  
 
This example hints at how the Islamic social contract might have differed to that of 
Northwestern Europe. Another is the fact that the notion of municipalities and self-
governing cities was not conceived until the mid-19th century, when it too was imported 
from the West and even then it was only confined to a few cities (Kuran 2001:842, 
Mardin 1969:265). Thus, the development of semi-democratic local public organization 
was greatly hampered, as were prospects for local representation, accountability and 
collective action.  
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When we look at this in terms of the social contract, we wish to shed light upon two main 
features. First, in terms of state output, the Arab-Muslim states did not have the habit of 
providing the public goods, such as education and poverty relief, that in the West became 
embedded in society. Instead, this was founded by wealthy members of various elites, 
and administered by religious scholars. Second, as for the input to the state’s treasury, the 
Islamic empires’ dependence on tax-farming4 was much more widespread than in the 
West, and although it existed there as well, the custom lived on for a longer time (at least 
up until the mid-19th century). Furthermore, tax-farming was not, as in Europe, restricted 
to indirect taxation, such as sales or custom taxes (Kiser, 2008), but was also used to 
gather land tax and poll tax from citizens.  
 
The most important result of our comparison is that we may have found the answer to the 
puzzling lack of democratization in the MENA region. Our answer is, in one sentence, 
that this has not been caused by the (Islamic) religion as such, but largely by how 
religious practices have been financed. In the Christian West, religion has been financed 
“from below” from which has followed semi-democratic representation, transparency and 
accountability. In the Arab-Muslim countries, religion has been financed “from above” 
thereby hindering the development of semi-democratic representation as well as systems 
for transparency and accountability in public affairs. We want again to underline the fact 
that the local religious organizations in both areas came also to handle a number of 
secular matters such as legal advice, poverty relief and infrastructure. The importance of 
the financial side of the religion and politics nexus has to our knowledge been lacking in 
existing research. For example, it is not dealt with in any of the twenty-five chapters in 
the recently published Handbook of Religion and Politics (Haynes 2008). 
 
Although many reminiscences of these historical institutional forms remains to this day, 
not least in the form of clan loyalties (Palmstierna 2009), one can of course argue if the 
practices dating many centuries back as the ones we have described here really can 
explain todays situation regarding the lack of democracy in the MENA region and the 
                                                 
4 The selling out of the right to collect taxes to private entrepreneurs 
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stability of democratic system of governance in Northwestern Europe. To this, we would 
like to make two arguments, one theoretical and one empirical. The first one is that 
although what we have analyzed above has been strictly confined to institutional forms, 
one can argue that institutions like these that have been operating for a very long time 
will translate into cultural norms and habits, entities that Douglass North labels “shared 
mental models” (North 1998). The reason is that formal institutions that have been 
operating for a very long time can simply get taken for granted, which means that the 
distinction between institution and culture (or formal and informal institutions) as 
explanations becomes blurred. Aronsson argues that one result of the influence the 
Swedish peasant from at least the late 16th century had in their local assemblies over 
many important church related as well as secular matters was the development of a 
political self-consciousness which brought  
 
an increased knowledge of the government system and its officials, 
and also made possible an emerging "civic" and self-regulative 
consciousness. This in turn led to an increase in power resources and 
the potential for collective action (Aronsson 1992b:44). 
 
Thus, institutional arrangements over time translated into a specific mindset about the 
role of ordinary people in the affairs of the local as well as the central state, what 
Douglass North (1998) has called “shared mental maps” which he sees as an informal 
institution.  Our empirical argument rests on the fact that we are not the first ones who try 
to show the “longue durée” of historical structures as argued by the so called Annales 
School in historiography (Braudel 1985). One of the most well-known analysis in this 
vein is Robert Putnam’s (1993) study of social capital in modern day Italy where he 
traces the large difference between the Italian south and north back to the political 
institutions that were established during the 14th and 15th centuries (city-states in the 
North, absolutist feudalism in the south, see also Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2008 who 
traces these differences even further back in history). In addition to the wealth of 
empirical research Putnam and his research associates produced to confirm their finding, 
we can add that a very recent survey of corruption and other forms of problems in 
government institutions at the regional level in EU member states gives a remarkable 
 
 
- 30 -
support to Putnam’s now almost twenty year old study (Charron et. al 2010). Regions in 
northern Italy are according to this survey as clean from corruption and similar practices 
as is Denmark, while Italy’s southern regions are among the most corrupt in Europe and 
have a quality of government probably far below many developing countries in for 
example sub-Saharan Africa. From this, we take comfort that our main hypothesis how 
the “temples” have been historically financed and not what has taken place within them, 
accounts for the lack of democracy in the Arab-Muslim countries as well as the strength 
of democracy in Northwestern Europe.  
 
The legacy of communalism in Northwester Europe can also been seen in the type of so 
called corporatist structures for policy making and policy implementation that from the 
late 19th century has been and to some extent still is prominent in the Continental and 
Northern European countries. At local and also at the national level, this system was built 
on the principle of having the interest organizations that had a stake in the issues directly 
involved and in many cases letting them have a dominant influence of how policies 
should be enacted and implemented in order to ensure consensus and cooperation 
(Streeck and Schmitter 1985, Rothstein 2005:ch. 8). 
  
Lastly, our analysis indicates that much of the current thinking in political science about 
what constitutes democratic legitimacy in the Western world may be fundamentally 
wrong. Most of this reasoning has been driven by American theorists such as Robert 
Dahl, David Easton and William Riker and have been based on the Schumpeterian idea of 
understanding democracy as an arena for managing conflicting interests. These interests 
may have varied (economic, social, religious, identity) but the problem has been how to 
reconcile majority rule with the protection of minority rights plus understanding why 
groups that loose out electorally in the long run accept to be losers. If the communal 
understanding of the historical roots of Western democracy that we have described above 
is correct, then what constitutes democratic legitimacy should be sought for not in how 
the democratic system can handle conflicting interests and appease losers, but instead on 
how good it is to create consensus among different groups and to what extent it can 
produce and implement public goods in an acceptable (read accountable) way. This 
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should move the focus of which processes that produces political legitimacy from the 
“input” side of the political system to the “output” side (Rothstein 2009). Such a move 
would be in line with recent empirical work about how to explain which factors that are 
most important for citizens when they make up their mind if or not their political system 
is legitimate. In the words of Bruce Gilley (2006:57-58):          
   
General governance (a composite of the rule of law, control of corruption 
and government effectiveness) clearly has a large, even overarching, 
importance in global citizen evaluation of the legitimacy of states… it is 
notable that democratic rights, while certainly qualifying as one of the 
most important causes of legitimacy, turn out to be roughly on par with 
welfare gains, and both of these are far less important than good 
governance. This clashes with standard liberal treatments of legitimacy 
that give overall priority to democratic rights. 
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